Moral behaviour: self-other, considering-obeying

1. RELIGIOUS OTHER-OBEDIENCE. The ‘Divine Command’ theory of ethics is widely critiqued and dismissed by moral philosophers because of its ‘heteronomy’. At worst it is presented as blind compulsion and seen to apply wherever that authority is understood as extending to the Bible, or another Scripture; to the Priest, the Guru or the Imam; or to the Church, the Umma or other religious community; or an ultimate, transcendent source. It is no less open to question when it appears in functionally equivalent secular versions as Manifesto, Leader, or Party. This sort of ought risks surrendering its own capacity for moral discernment to a perceived and, though rationally questionable, superior authority. Less an internal ought, more an external instruction. However, that said, religious other-obedience may still be ‘owned’ because individually/consciously endorsed.  

2. RELIGIOUS SELF-OBEDIENCE. Rather than being externally derived, this version of religious ought comes from within: “it’s just wrong I know deep down”, “my gut feeling tells me..”, “my conscience is shaming in advance or guilt-generating in retrospect”, “I can do no other”, “it’s the voice of God within”, “being at one with the eternal Tao.” Such sense of religious ought takes the form of internal compunction, rather than external obedience. It’s felt from within and therefore autonomous. A moral psychologist might agree, or they might say ‘it depends’. Is it perhaps only ‘the introjection of parental inhibition’, or even ‘a stubbornly indulgent and fear-animated over-sensitivity'? 

3. RELIGIOUS SELF-CONSIDERATION/EGOCENTRICITY.  
Traditionally this is perhaps most powerfully evident in the form of the post-mortem/after death carrot and stick. For instance, the ought in a person’s self-image and behaviour may be influenced by uncertainty/anxiety regarding what’s beyond death. Even if my wrong-doing isn’t picked up during my life-time, “I can’t get away with it.” Its consequences might be hellish rather than paradisal. They might lead to karmic regression rather than enhancement. They might have compounding family consequences - “The Lord...visits the iniquity of the fathers on the children and the children’s children, to the third and the fourth generation.” In other words, this religious ought is backed by a strong appeal to self-interest, and therefore might well be judged to be morally questionable. It’s rather like receipt of presents from Santa Claus being used to incentivise children’s good behaviour. 

4. RELIGIOUS OTHER-CONSIDERATION/ALTRUISM.  
It’s no less likely for religious ought to inspire autonomous concern for others – love of neighbour, care for poor/sick/stranger. Such behaviour is exemplified and promoted in the lives and teachings of Prophets and mentors. Its responsive care doesn’t depend on legal obligation or professional duty. It takes stock, it recognises need, and it acts accordingly. It discriminates positively. Here, the moral philosopher will approve of the priority being given to ‘empathy’, but may point to the risk of over-identification resulting in a potentially fatal carelessness for self. That same philosopher may also check for the extent to which the caring consideration is universally applied. How consistently or absolutely does it apply irrespective of race or nationality, of gender, age, or species as ‘all living creatures’?  

C. IN CHECKING ANY CORRELATION OF RELIGION AND ETHICS, 'RE' AND 'ME', HOW ARE ‘RELIGION’ AND ‘GOD’ BEST DEFINED?   
Is the former an umbrella term for a distinctive institutional tradition of human belonging? Or does it more comprehensively refer to a person’s deepest beliefs? Or both? Is the latter principally named in scriptural terms and/or the wondrous root of all being?